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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TESTING
IN THE WORKPLACE

Michael S. Cecerel/
Philip B. Rosen Introduction
Substance abuse, whether of alcohol or drugs, in our
society has reached epidemic proportions. The workplace is no
exception. Indeed, substance abuse by employees infects every
sector of the American workplace:
Professional, managerial, and
hourly. A confidential survey by the National Cocaine Helpline
showed that seventy-five percent of those surveyed used drugs on
the job, forty-four percent dealt drugs to fellow employe ,
and twenty-five percent reported daily drug use at work.
After a drug-screening program was implemented by the United
States Postal Service in Philadelphia, 230 job applicants wre
rejected based upon the results of their urinalysis tests.
In California, when various banks informed job applicants that
all applicants would be screened for drugs, thirty-five to

1/ The authors are partners in the law firm of Jackson, Lewis,
Schnitzler & Krupman; which is engaged exclusively in the
practice of labor and employment law on behalf of management
throughout the United States. The authors wish to express their
appreciation to Meryl R. Kaynard, associate, Ilene T. Weisbard,
paralegal, and Louis R. Satriale, law clerk, at Jackson, Lewis,
Schnitzler & Krupman for their assistance in the preparation of
this Acticle.
This article first appeared in Volume 62, Issue 5, Notre Dame
Law Review 859 (1987), and is reprinted here with permission by the
Notre Dame Law Review, University of Notre Dame. We accept full
responsibility for any errors in reprinting or editing.
2/ O'Boyle, More Firms Require Employee Drug Tests, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 8, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
3/ Kerr, Drug Tests Losing Most Court Cases, N.Y. Times,
December 11, 1986, at Al, Col. 1.

4,
forty percent failed to return. In New Jersey, an autopsy of
the pilot involved in an airplane crash which killed two crewmen
revealed that Ve pilot had been smoking marijuana, possibly
while flying.
In San Jose, California, the police recovered
$250,000 worth of computer parts stolen by Silicon Valley
6/
electronics workers attempting to finance their drug habits. In response to this epidemic, employers have turned to
workplace substance testing programs. Although the authors feel
employers have both legal and moral bases for imposing drug
tests, such programs can impinge upon employee privacy rights
and civil liberties.
This Article addresses the legal implications of workplace substance abuse testing in both the public
and private employment sectors.
It also examines how federal
and state laws impact on such procedures. The Article consists
of four component parts:
Part one examines the impact of
substance abuse testing on employees' privacy rights, Part two
looks into the impact of handicap and discrimination laws,
Part three focuses on collective bargaining agreements, and
Part four suggests criteria for effective substance abuse
testing programs in both the public and private sector. The
authors conclude that such testing may be lawfully conducted in
both the public and private sectors within defined parameters.
I.

Substance Abuse Testing and Privacy Rights
A.

Employer Interests

Employers, whether public or private, have a right to
control their workplace to ensure its efficiency, safety, and in
the private sector, profitability. Substance abuse adversely
affects all three concerns. In 1986 alone substance abuse cost

4/ McKenna, Most Banks Reluctant to Test Employees for Druq Use,
AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 18, 1985, at 25.
See also, Note, Drug
Testing in the Workplace: A Legislative Proposal to Protect Privacy
13 J. LEGIS. 269 (1986).
5/ Castro, Battling the Enemy Within, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at
52.
6/ Bishop, Coast Electronics Plants Fighting Drug Abuse Among
Workers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1985, Section 1, at 5, Col. 1.
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-7/
employers over sixteen billion dollars in lost productivity.
Today's accident rates for substance abusers 8 re three and
one-half times greater than for nonabusers. Industrial
accidents (which normally lead to workers' compensation claims)
are likely
occur two or three times more often with alcoholic
employees 1 0 7
Absenteeism and tardiness is three times
greater. Furthermo
the quality of the abuser's work is
generally substandard.

In exchange for the employer's right to control the
workplace the law imposes certain duties upon him. The employer's
duty to provide employees with a safe wT5ing environment is
imposed by statute and common law. Public employers
14/
nave an additional general duty to protect the public welfare. Substance abuse testing may be undertaken by employers exercising
these rights and discharging these duties.
However, these
employer interests must be balanced against the rights of
individual employees.
B.

Employee Privacy Rights

The fourth amendment to the United Stins Constitution
establishes, derivatively, a right to privacy. It prohibits

7/ Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace:
Cost, Controls, and
Controversies (Washington, D.C.:
The Bureau of National
Affairs, 1986), at 6-9.
8/ Id. at 8.
9/ Id. at 7.
10/ Id.
11/ Id. at 7.9.
12/ 29 U.S.C. Section 651

(1982).

13/ Tolbert v. Martin Marietta Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1099, 1103
(D. Colo. 1985).
14/ Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
1986).

(D.N.J.

15/ Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States,
(Footnote Continued)
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the federal government and igagents from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures. -The prohibition applies to the 1 7 /
states and their agents by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. It does nyJ / apply to private employers in the absence of "state
action". _
In determining whether state or federal governmental
action violates the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the courts require the
19/
government to demonstrate a legitimate government interest. Under this analysis, the government's interest served by the
search or seizure is balanced against the 2 i dividual's privacy
expectations under the fourth amendment. Even if the
government's interest outweighs individual privacy expectations,
the courts must examine the government's specific conduct. The
government's conduct must be substantially related to its stated
interest and not overly intrusive to the individual before the
courts wi /uphold the constitutionality of the search or
seizure. Courts have found substance abuse testing by public
employers to be a form of search and s
ure subject to the
restrictions of the fourth amendment.
The ultimate

(Footnote Continued)
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1966).
16/ United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
17/ MaPP v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
18/ Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475

(1921).

19/ Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513; National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 643 F. Supp. 380, 390 (E.D. La. 1986),
vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), emergency stay denied, 107
S. Ct. 3182 (1987).
20/ New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).

(1985); Bell v.

21/ Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559.
22/ Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D.
(Footnote Continued)

determination of any search's reasonableness requires a judicious
balancing of the intrusiveness of the sljch against its promotion
Government employees,
of a legitimate governmental interest. federal and state, cannot lawfully be subjected to unreasonable
substance abuse testing programs because of fourth amendment
restrictions. What is unreasonable in a given case depends upon
its facts.
C.
1.

Constitutionality of Public Employer
Substance Abuse Testing Proarams

The Government's Legitimate Interest in Implementing Such a
Program

The first factor courts examine is whether the government has a legitimate interest served by the program. The
government is most successful in meeting this burden in areas
where it already extensively regulates for public safety reasons.
luthe recent case of Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power
the district court upheld a drug screening program
District, established by the Nebraska Public Power District ("NPPD") under
which all employees having access to "protected" areas of a
to drug screening randomly or
nuclear power plant we ,subjected
Employees testing positively were
at least once a year. given the choice of entering an employee assistan /program or
Two
facing disciplinary action, including discharge.
employees challenged the program on, inter alia, fourth amendment
grounds. The court upheld the program. It found that the
government's interest in operating a safe nuclear power plant
outweighed employee privacy expectations. The court found that

(Footnote Continued)
Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
23/ Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); United States
v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
24/ 654 F. Supp. 1510
25/ Id. at 1516.
26/ Id.

(D. Neb. 1987).

such privacy expectations were reduced bL7
pervasive regulation of nuclear plants.

he government's

The Third Circuit confronted a testing progw of the
New Jersey Racing Commission in Shoemaker v. Handel. Under
the program, the Commission required jockeys to undergo a
urinalysis on a random basis even in the absence of reasonable
suspicion of drug abuse. Here, too, the court upheld the
program, finding that the State's interest in regulating the
racing industry outweighed the jockeys' privacy expectations.
The court noted that the jockeys' privacy expectations were
diminished because the industry is 6hly regulated and the
jockeys are licensed by the state. A third drug testing cas ,Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, concerned the constitutionality of a substance abuse testing program established by the
Chicago Transit Authority. Under the program, bus drivers were
required to submit to blood tests or urinalysis whenever they
were involved in a "serious accident" or suspectedlof being
intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics. -The union
challenged the constitutionality of the program on fourth
amendment grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the program. It determined that the Transit Authority's
interest in "protecting the public by insuring that bus . . .
operators are fit to perform their job . . ." was "paramount"
and outweigh /any employee expectations of privacy regarding
such tests.

27/ Id. at 1524-25.
28/ 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.),
(1986).

cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577

29/ Id. at 1142. The New Jersey program also subjected
jockeys, trainers, officials and grooms to take breathalyzer
tests when directed by the State Steward. Id. no. 1.
30/ 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976).
31/ Id. at 1266.
32/ Id. at 1267.
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The preceding decisions demonstrate that a legitimate
government interest supports the constitutionality of a substance
abuse testing program in the public sector. However, such an
interest alone does not guarantee the constitutionality of the
program.
2.

The Government's Reasonable Suspicion of Substance Abuse

Even where the government has a legitimate interest in
undertaking a substance abuse testing program, it will not
always be successful defending it in court. A number of courts
have struck down testing programs as violating the fourth
amendment because no reasonable suspicion of substance abuse by
a particular employee was required.
In Capua v. City of Plainfield, 33/ a district court
confronted a substance abuse testing program implemented by the
Plainfield, New Jersey, police and fire departments. Under the
program, all members of both departments were subject to surprise,
mass urinalysis. The City based the program upon its conclusion
that employing "drug-free" police and firefi1ters was mandated
by its duty to protect the public welfare. In May 1986, a surprise, mass urinalysis, found traces
of drugs in sixteen members of the Plainfjgd fire department.
All sixteen were terminated without pay. The sixteen
firefighters and one civilian member of the police department,
who had been suspended for positive test res
s, filed suit to
overturn their terminations and suspension. They challenged
the constitutionality of the program as an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs. It found that
the program "sweeps up the innocent with the guilty and willingly
sacrifices each individual's fourth/amendment rights in the name
of some larger public interest". -The court further found
that the "[City] had no general job-related basis for instituting

33/ 643 F. Supp. 1507
34/ Id. at 1512.
35/ Id.
36/ Id.
37/ Id. at 1517.

(D.N.J. 1986).

this mass urinalysis, much less any individualized basis". 18/
The court noted that the City had no specific information or
independent knowledge of any o59ahe department members being
under the influence of drugs. None of the plaintiffs had
received prior warnings for below-standard job performance. Nor
was there an X0 vidence of an increased incidence of accidents or
complaints. The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
privacy expectations
weighed the state's interest in implementing the program.
A second case which initially found a government
testing prograiunlawful is National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab. Von Raab involved a substance abuse testing
program implemented by the Vted States Customs Service pursuant
to Executive Order 12,564. That Order, signed by President
Reagan on September 15, 1986, mandated drug testing for employees
in sensitive jobs involving l/enforcement, public health or
safety or national security. It further authorized testing
for "nonsensitive" civilian employees where:
(i) there is
reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use; (ii) it relates to an
accident or unsafe practice; or (iii) &
is in follow-up to
rehabilitation for illegal drug use. The Order also requires
each government agency to develop its own testing program
consistent with, 4 ong other things, its "mission" and employees'
privacy rights. Under the program implemented by the Customs Service,
all employees selected for promotion were required to undergo

38/ Id. at 1516.
39/ Id.
40/ Id.
41/ Id. at 1520.
42/ 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. ±986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170
(5th Cir.), emeraency stay denied, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987).
43/ 51 Fed. Reg. 32, 889
44/ Id. 32, 892-93.
45/ Id. at 32, 890.
46/ Id.

(1986).

If they refused, they would not be promoted. 47/
urinalysis.
The specimen was collected in the presence of a customs service
"laboratory representative".
The Union challenged the constitutionality of the program on fourth amendment grounds.
The court found that the urinalysis constituted a 48/
"full-blown search" triggering fourth amendment protections. It then noted that the government neither had knowledge of nor
suspected any employee of selling or using drugs on the job.
Thus, the "search" was made in
total absence of probable
cause or reasonable suspicion. As such, the court declared
that the plan was an "overly intrusive policy of searches and
seizures without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, in
violation of legitimae expectations of privacy and was wholly
unconstitutional". --- It characterized the program as "a
degrading procedure that so detracts from human dignity and
self-respect that it 'shock~l~he conscience' and offends this
Court's sense of justice". On appeal, however, the Fifth
Circuit vacated the district court's permanent injuncti /and
reinstated the Customs Service's drug testing program.
Following that decision, the National Treasury Employees Union
applied for an emergency stay of the Customs Service's drug
testing program. The gjted States Supreme Court denied the
stay on June 1, 1987. The question of whether the testing
program is constitutional has yet to be decided by the Supreme
Court.
A New York appellate court struck down a
mandatory drug testing program for school teachers
Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educa
n
Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District. -

similar
in Patchogueof the
Under that

47/ 649 F. Supp. at 382.
48/ Id. at 386.
49/ Id. at 387.
50/ Id.
51/ Id. at 388.
52/

816 F.2d 170.

53/ 107 S. Ct. 3182
54/

(1987).

119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888

(N.Y. App. Div. 1986).

program, all probationary school teachers were subject to
mandatory urinalysis before permanent appointment. The teachers'
union attacked the program as an illegal search in vig ation of
the fourth amendment and as an invasion of privacy. The
court held that "the reasonable suspicion standard is the
appropriate basis for constitutionally compelling a public
school teacher to submit to a urine test for
purpose of
detecting the use of controlled substances".
Comparing the cases involving testing by public
employers reveals that a legitimate government interest, supposedly
served by testing, will not always outweigh employee privacy
rights. The courts are more likely to defer to the government
interest in cases involving heavily regulated industries where
clear dangers to the public welfare exist. Transportation and
nuclear power appear to be foremost among such industries.
However, even in those industries, it is unsettled whether
testing not based on reasonable suspicion of substance abuse
will withstand judicial scrutiny. In any event, testing based
on reasonable suspicion of drug abuse is far more likely to be
upheld on constitutional grounds.
3.

The Government's Program is No More Intrusive
than Reasonably Necessary to Serve the Government's
Interest

Another factor courts examine is the intrusiveness of
the testing program. The courts require that the program be no
more intrusive than reasonably necessary to serve the government's
interest. The degree of intrusion engendered by any search must
be viewed in the context of the individual's legitimate

55/ Id. at 37,

505 N.Y.S.2d at 889.

56/ Id. at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891. Accord Turner v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985) (upholding a District
of Columbia police department program which required reasonable
suspicion before administering a drug test).
Cf. Allen v. City
of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482. (N.D. Ga. 1985) (upholding tests
administered in connection with an undercover investigation of
city employees suspected of using marijuana on the job).
But see Mc Donnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987)
(modifying a district court which required reasonable suspicion,
thereby allowing urinalyses uniformly or by systematic random
selection of employees having regular contact with prisoners on
a day-to-day basis in medium or maximum security prisons).
14

expectation of privacy. 57/ The test for determining when an
expectation of privacy is legitimate was articulated by Jus"[T]here is a twofold
tice Harlan in Katz v. United States:
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
that society is prepared to recognize as
expectation be
This standard is used to differentiate
'reasonable ."
between levels and degrees of intrusiveness among searches and
seizures.
"As measured by the expectation of privacy, inspections of personal effects are generally least intrusive, while
breaches of the 'integrity of the body' result in the greatest
invasion of privacy." '
In summary, a government employer substance abuse
testing program will most likely pass constitutional muster
where:
(1) the government has a legitimate interest in implementing such a program; (2) the program is substantially related
to that interest; (3) submission is required only of employees
reasonably suspected of substance abuse; and (4) the program is
no more intrusive than reasonably necessary to serve the government's interest.
D.

Constitutionality of Private Employer
Substance Abuse Testing Programs

As stated earlier in this Article, the United States
Constitution's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
does not6 8ply to private employers in the absence of state
action. State constitutional provisions protecting the
right of privacy are found in Alaska, Arizona, California,
linois' Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina,
Florida, Hawaii, 6
Some state constitutions (such as California)
and Washington. --

57/ Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507

(D.N.J.

1986).
58/

389 U.S. 347,

361

(1967) (Harlan, J.,

59/

Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.

concurring).

60/ Burdeau v. McDowell, 256, U.S. 465, 475

(1921).

61/ In determining the elements of a privacy tort, the courts
generally look to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Sections 652A-652I, which defines the relevant torts as follows:
(Footnote Continued)
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prohibit unreasonable
rches and seizures by private, as well
as public, employers.
Thus, in those states, the constitutional principles previously discussed are instructive.
Nevertheless, even in those states whose constitutions
do not apply to private employers, their testing programs will
be subject to constitutional scrutiny under federal law where
"state action" is found to have occurred. The courts are most

(Footnote Continued)
(a)

Intrusion upon Seclusion

"One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person."
Id. Section 652B.
(b)

Public Disclosure of Private Facts

"One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
legitimate concern to the public."
Id. Section 652D.
(c)

False Light

"One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
another that places the other before the public in a
false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in
which the other was placed would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge
of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed."
Id.
62/ CAL. CONST. art. I, Section 13.
See also White v. Davis,
13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975) (public
and private employers prohibited from secretly gathering personal
information or from overly broad collection or retention of
personal information regarding employees or applicants unless
the employer has a compelling interest).

16

(1) acts
likely to find state action where a privat 3 mployer:
(2) permits the
in concert with a law enforcement agency; government to hire, promote, terminate, or reinstate the private
employer's employees; or (3) allows its employees to 6 12 rk on
In
government property or to use government equipment. those instances, a private employer substance abuse testing
program will be subject to federal constitutional standards.
Furthermore, at least one state, Utah, has drafted a statute
giving specific guidelines on how p .ate employers are allowed
ly
Those guidelines cl
to conduct drug and alcohol tests. --resemble the constitutional limitations described earlier.

63/ Lehr & Middlebrooks, Workplace Privacy Issues and Employer
Screening Policies, EMPLOYER REL. L. J. 407, 408

(1985).

64/ Id.
65/ Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, 1987 Utah Laws Section 234
(codified at UTAH CODE ANN. Sections 34-38-1 to 34-38-15 (Supp.
1987)).
66/ The guidelines set forth in Utah's Drug and Alcohol
Testing Act are as follows:
All sample collection and testing for drugs and
alcohol under this chapter shall be performed in
accordance with the following conditions:
(1) the collection of samples shall be performed under
reasonable and sanitary conditions;
(2) samples shall be collected and tested with due
regard to the privacy of the individual being tested,
and in a manner reasonably calculated to prevent
substitutions or interference with the collection or
testing of reliable samples;
(3) sample collection shall be documented, and the
documentation procedures shall include:
(a) labeling of samples so as reasonably to
preclude the probability of erroneous identification of test results; and
(Footnote Continued)
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II.

Substance Abuse Testing and Handicap or
Disability Discrimination Laws

Absent state action, an applicable state constitution,
or a specific statute, a private employer's substance abuse
testing program still poses problems under federal and state
handicap or disability discrimination laws, and other state
statutory and common law. Alcoholism and dru5/addiction are
and under the
es under federal law handicaps or disabil
Consequently, employer substance abuse
law of most states. testing programs, whether public or private, may be restricted
by handicap or disability discrimination laws.

(Footnote Continued)
(b) an opportunity for the employee or prospective
employee to provide notification of any information
which he considers relevant to the test, including
identification of currently or recently used
prescription or nonprescription drugs, or other
relevant medical information;
(4) sample collection, storage, and transportation to
the place of testing shall be performed so as reasonably
to preclude the probability of sample contamination or
adulteration; and
(5) sample testing shall conform to scientifically
accepted analytical methods and procedures. Testing
shall include verification or confirmation of any
positive test result by gas chromatography, gas
chromatography-mass spectroscopy, or other comparably
reliable analytical method, before the result of any
test may be used as a basis for any action by an
employer under Section 34-38-8.
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 34-38-6, as enacted by H.B. 145, L. 1987,
effective April 26, 1987.
67/ See infra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
68/ See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.

Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973
69/
(RehaThe Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 bilitation Act) is a federal law prohibiting discrimination in
employment against "otherwise qualified 7 8ndicapped individuals"
The law applies only
solely on the basis of their handica i/-and recipients of
to employers wit 2 ederal contracts Its reach, however, is broader. Many state
federal grants. handicap discrimination laws are either patterned on or interpreted consistent with the Rehabilitation Act. Those laws are
Two key terms in the
examined in Section II B of this Article.
Rehabilitation Act, "handicapped" and "otherwise qualified,"
must be examined further.
A.

1.

"Handicapped" Defined

The Rehabilitation Act defines a "handicapped individual"
as one "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an 7 pairment, or (iii) is
Congress amended the
regarded as having such an impairment". Rehabilitation Act in 1978, adding the following limitation to
the definition of "handicapped individual":
(S]uch term does not include any individual who is an
alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol
or drugs prevents such individual from performing the
duties of the job in question or whose employment, by
reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would
constitute 149 irect threat to property or the safety
of others.

69/ Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. Sections 701-796 (1982)).
70/ 29 U.S.C.A. Section 794 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
71/ Id. Section 793.
72/ Id. Section 794.
73/ Id. Section 706(8) (B).
74/ Id.

(emphasis added).

To the extent this amendment leaves any doubt that
alcohol and drug addiction are handicaps under the Rehabilitation
Act, that doubt has been dispelled by subsequent administrative
and judicial interpretations. The United States Attorney
General, in a formal opinion, concluded that alcohol ae/drug
Th/
addiction are handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act. conclusion has been endorsed by numerous judicial decisions.
2.

"Otherwise Qualified" Defined

The Rehabilitation Act protects from employment
discrimination only those handicapped individuals who are
"otherwise qualified".
A handicapped individual is "otherwise
(a) notwithstanding the handicap, he or she
qualified" where:
can perform the essential duties of the job in question, or
(b) is capable of performing those duties with reasonable
accommodation by the employer, provided such accommodation would
not impose an undue hardship on the employer, and (c) his or her
performance would not pose a direct threat t? 7 he health or
Whether a
safety of the handicapped person or others. handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified" is 1 8 5actual
question to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
In Davis v. Bucher, -9 the City of Philadelphia
promulgated an employment policy which provided in pertinent
part that the City could refuse to examine a job applicant or
could disqualify one who was addicted to alcohol or drugs. The
They claimed they were
plaintiffs were former drug addicts.
denied employment solely on the basis of their past drug abuse
without regard to their qualifications and ability to do the job

75/ 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12

(1977).

76/ See, e-a., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d
1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Tinch v. Walters, 573 F. Supp. 346 (E.D.
Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
sub nom., Traynor v. Turnage, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); Davis v.
Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
77/ School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123,
1131 n. 17 (1987).
78/ Id. at 1311.
79/ 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).

for which they applied. 0/
This, they argued, violated the
Rehabilitation Act. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment relying on United States Department of
Health, Education aniljelfare regulations promulgated under the
Rehabilitation Act. It found that the plaintiffs were
handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act in that they had
records of prior physical impairment (drug addiction).
It
further found that the City's blanket disqualification of the
plaintiffs for employment based solely on those records, and
without regard to their abilities to perform the jobs in question,
constituted
dicap discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
The Second Circuit reached a slar
result in
Whittaker v. Board of Higher Education. There, the New York
City Board of Higher Education denied the plaintiff, a college
teacher, tenure and the use of an honorary title because of his
alcoholism. Whittaker challenged the Board's action under the
Rehabilitation Act. He argued that, although he was an alcoholic,
the condition was under control and did not interfere with his
ability to satisfactorily perform the duties of his job. The
court agreed, finding that if the Board's action was based
solely on the plaintiff's alcoholism, without any showing that
the impairment prevented him from performing his job dutiegit
was handicap discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. Where, however, alcoholism or drug addiction does
prevent an employee from satisfactorily performing his or heE5 /
job, a different outcome will result. In Heron v. McGuire, a New York City police officer was suspended and subjected to
disciplinary proceedings because a sample of his blood obtained
by the police department showed traces of heroin. The department
based the blood test on its suspicion that the officer was

80/ Id. at 793.
81/ Id. at 796, See also, 42 Fed. Reg. 22, 686
82/ Id. at 801.
83/ 461 F. Supp. 99
84/

(E.D.N.Y. 1978).

Id. at 106.

85/ 802 F.2d 67

(2d Cir. 1986).

(1977).

This suspicion arose when the off cr's attendance
abusing drugs.
became erratic and his job performance declined.
The officer brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act.
He claimed his heroin addiction was a handicap entitling him to
the protection of the Rehabilitation Act. The court disagreed,
finding that the officer's addiction rendered him unfit for
police work. Among other things, it "impaired . . . his ajity
to respond to emergency and life-threatening situations".
The behavioral manifestations of the addiction prevented the
officer's successful performance on the job. This finding
was entirely consistent with, if not Lpdated by, the 1978
amendment to the Rehabilitation Act. Since alcohol or drug addiction is a handicap under
the Act, any substance abuse testing by employers covered by the
Act is subject to its provisions and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.
3.

Substance Abuse Testing Under the Rehabilitation Act and
the Regulations Thereunder

Under the Rehabilitation Act, medical examinations may
be conducted in connection with employment decisions, notwithstanding the Rehabilitation Act's prohibition against handicap
discrimination. --- Of course, employer actions based on the
results of such medical examinations are circumscribed. Thus,
for example, an employer may not, solely because of a handicap
revealed during such an examination, deny employment where:
(i) the handicap does not prevent the individual from performing
the essential functions of the job in question; or (ii) reasonable
accommodation of the handicap will enable the individual to

86/

Id. at 68.

87/

Id.

88/

Id. at 69.

89/ Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental
Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, Section 122,
92 Stat. 2984, 2985 (1985) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A.
Section 706(8) (B) (West Supp. 1987)).
90/ 45 C.F.R. Section 84.14(c) (1986).

perform those functions; and (iii) the handicap doe M~ot pose a
direct threat to the property or safety of others. The Rehabilitation Act specifies that such examin ion
may take place after an offer of employment has been made. Thus, an employer may "condition an offer of employment on the
results of a medica 3 7xamination conducted prior to the employee's
entrance on duty". The Rehabilitation Act also does not
appear to prohibit subsequent annual physicals for all employees.
The scope of the physical may be comprehensive. At least
insofar as private employ
are concerned it may include
substance abuse testing. Inclusion of such testing by
public sector employers would be sub 7 ct to fourth amendment
-restrictions previously discussed.
Applicants or employees should be informed of the
purpose of the test before the actual examination. The test
should be to determine whether the employee or applicant is
suffering from any medical conditions that impairs his or her
ability to perform the essential duties of the job in question
or would pose a direct threat to the property or safety of
themselves or others. The more prudent course for an employer
is to apprise each individual of the specific conditions (such
as substance abuse) for which the examination will be conducted.
The most efficient means of disclosure would be providing a
written list of conditions being tested for at the time of and
immediately prior to the examination. Absent communication of
this information, the employee's consent to the examination may

91/ 29 U.S.C.A. Section 706(8) (B) (West Supp. 1987).
92/ 45 C.F.R. Section 84.14(c)
93/

(1986).

Id.

94/ Association of W. Pulp and Paper Workers v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 644 F. Supp. 183 (D.C. Or. 1986); IBEW Local Union
No. 1900 v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 634 F. Supp. 642 (D. Colo.
1986).
95/ U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).

Ineffective
be uninformed, and therefore ineffective. 6/
97/
consent can result in a claim for battery.
In addition to such comprehensive physicals by private
employers, specific testing for substance abuse may be conducted
any time by public or private employers where the employer has a
reasonable suspicion of such abuse. The suspicion must be
founded upon objective evidence such as deteriorating job 98/
performance, erratic attendance or other similar behavior. Consistent with the employer's right to base employment
decisions on the results of the examination, test results should
be kept confidential. Only those managers participating in
employment decision making should have access to the findings.
Broader publication could expose employers to invasion of
privacy or defamation claims, depending upon the nature of the
findings and the law of the jurisdiction in question. Therefore,
any analysis of the legal implications of substance abuse
yld be incomplete without an overview
testing in the workplace
of pertinent state laws.
B.

State Handicap Discrimination Laws

An overwhelming majority of states prohibit handicap
or disability employment discrimination by public and private
employers. The provisions of those laws vary from state to
state. All of the laws reach medical impairments or conditions.
However, the state definition of handicap or disability can be
as broad as those contained in the Rehabilitation Act or can be
narrower. The statutes and administrative interpretations may
be categorized as follows:
Some states specifically exclude
Model A:
current substance abusers from their definition of
handicap. These include California, Georgia, Kentucky,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and

96/ Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12

(1905).

97/ Id.
98/ McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987);
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
99/ See supra notes 64-65 and infra notes 99-103.

Virginia. 00/ North Carolina, however, prohibits
discrimination based on an individual's history of
drug or alcohol abuse whm/he or she is not currently
using drugs or alcohol. Model B: Some states protect alcoholics and drug
addicts as handicapped. These states include Illinois,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, My/Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
Model C:
Some states distinguish between addicts,
who are covered by the handicap laws, and "recreational
users," who are not within the amb 1 3 ?f the handicap
laws.
New Jersey is one example. Model D:
Some states remain silent on the issue.
Such states include, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana,

100/ CAL. GOV'T CODE Section 12926 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987);
GA. CODE ANN. Section 66-502(2) (Harrison Supp. 1986); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. Section 207.140(2)(b) (Baldwin 1986); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 49B, Section 15(g) and its interpretation at 63 Op. Md. Att'y
Gen. 408 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. Section 168A-3(4) (iii) (Supp. 1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. Section 43-33-560 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. art. 5221k, Section 2.01(7) (A) (Vernon 1987); VA. CODE ANN.
Section 51.01-3 (Supp. 1986).
101/ N.C. GEN. STAT. Section 168A-3(4)

(Supp. 1985).

102/ ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-103(I) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, Section 77 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. Section 49-2-101(16) (1985); MINN. STAT.
ANN. Section 363.01(25a) (West Supp. 1987) (excluding from
protection drug or alcohol abuse which prevents a person from
performing the essential functions of the job or constitutes a
direct threat to property or the safety of others); N.J. STAT.
ANN. Section 10:5-5(q) (West 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW Section 292(21) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
Section 4112.01(A) (13) (Anderson 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS Section 28-5-6(7) (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. Section 111.32(8) (West
Supp. 1986).
103/ Opinion letter by Pamela S. Poff, Director, State of
New Jersey Department of Civil Law and Public Safety Division on
Civil Rights, Janaury 23, 1986.

Michigan, New Hampshire, P-Biylvania, Tennessee and
the District of Columbia.
Unless drug and alcohol addiction are expressly
excluded from the ambit of a state's handicap discrimination
law, private and public employers in all states prohibiting
handicap or disability discrimination are well advised to
presume alcohol and drug addiction are included under those
laws. Thus, any testing programs in such states should be
implemented within the parameters discussed under the Rehabilitation Act, even though that Act is not itself applicable to
those employers who do not have government contracts or receive
federal funds.
C.

Reasonable Accommodation

Even though substance abuse testing may be lawfully
conducted within the limitations discussed earlier, actions
based upon the testing results are circumscribed. Adverse
employment decisions may not be based solely on the fact that
the individual is an alcohol or drug abuser where the abuse does
not prevent performance of the essential functions of the job in
question, or where reasonable accommodation of the condition
will allow the individual to perform those job functions, and
does not pose a direct threat to the property or safety of
others.
The Rehabilitation Act and state handicap or disability
discrimination laws impose upon covered employers the duty to
reasonably accommodate handicapped individuals so as to make

104/ CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Section 46a-60 (West. 1986); FLA.
STAT. ANN. Section 413.20(2) (West 1986); IDAHO CODE Section 56-707 (1976 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. Section 22-9-1-3(q) (II) (Supp. 1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. Section 3.550 (103) (Callaghan 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
Section 275-c:l (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN.
Section 954 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. Section 8-50-103 (Supp. 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. Section 1-2502(23)
(1981).
It should be noted, however, through telephone conversations with representatives, that the Connecticut Commission of
Human Rights and Opportunities, the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission and the Florida Commission on Human Relations have at
least indicated that they regard alcohol and/or drug abuse as
protected handicaps (the Florida agency has, thus far, so
indicated only for alcoholism).
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105/
available employment and advancement opportunities.
Employers are relieved of this duty where they can show accommohardship on the operation of the
dation would impose an uY
In addition, federal agencies must
business or enterprise. satisfy the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse aYMlcoholism Prevention,
which requires
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 federal agencies to provide alcoholism treatment programs for
federal employees. Reading this 1970 statute in conjunction
with the Rehabilitation Act makes clear Congress' intent that
federal agencies make affirmative efforts to assist alcoholic
employees in overcoming their handicap before undertaking
adverse employment action.
The regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation
Act list various actions that may be required as reasonable
accommodation, depending upon the circumstances:
(1) [Mjaking facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, and
(2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, the provision of8 readers or interpreters, and
other similar actions.
The above list is merely illustrative, and should not be considered
all inclusive.
In determining whether accommodation would impose
undue hardship, the size and type of the employer's operation
(including the number of employees, facilities, and nature of
e and cost of the
work or services performed) and the n4
Several recent cases
accommodation needed are considered. -

105/ 45 C.F.R. Section 84.12(a)
106/

(1986).

Id.

107/ Pub. L. No. 91-616, Section 201, 84 Stat. 1848, 1849
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. Sections 290aa-290ee (West
1985 & Supp. 1987)).
108/ 42 U.S.C.A. Section 84.12(b)(1),
1987).
109/ Id. Section 84.12(c)(1),

(2),

(2) (West 1985 & Supp.

(3).

illustrate the principles of reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship.
110/
an employee of the U.S.
In Whitlock v. Donovan, Department of Labor was an alcoholic.
The employee's drinking
problem seriously affected his work performance and attendance.
After experiencing an alcoholic seizure at work, he was referred
by his supervisor for counselling. After the worker participated
in an alcoholism out-patient program, his attendance and performance improved. However, about three years later, he relapsed.
He was again suspended and referred for counselling and treatment.
Upon his return to work, over the ensuing four-year period, the
Department took other steps to accommodate his condition. It
adjusted his work hours so he could continue in a rehabilitation
program and offered to transfer him to a less stressful job.
Despite these efforts, his work record worsened. Eventually,
the worker was discharged.
The employee sued the Department under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming that he was handicapped (alcoholism) and the
Depar M7 t failed to make reasonable accommodation before firing
him.
The court agreed, finding that while the Department
treated the employee with compassion and tolerance, its actions
fell short of l,
Rehabilitation Act's reasonable accommodation
requirement.
Furthermore, the Department had not shown
%e accommodation would have imposed an undue
that reaso
hardship. The employee was allowed to reapply for employment with the Department subject to a fitness-for-duty examinarehired; if not, he was to be
tion. If found fit, he was 2 0e
4
paid disability retirement.

UP

In another case, Walker v. Weinberger, 115/ a recovered
alcoholic brought action against his employer, the United States

110' 598 F. Supp. 126
Brock, 790 F.2d 964

(D.D.C. 1984),

(D.C. Cir. 1986).

111/ Id. at 128.
112/ Id. at 136.
113/ Id. at 137.
114/ Id. at 137-38.
115/ 600 F. Supp. 757

(D.D.C. 1985).

aff'd sub nom., Whitlock v.

Department of Defense. He alleged handicap discrimination in
violation of the Rehabilitation Act and the Comprehensive
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and RehabiliThe employee argued that the Department did not
tation Act.
reasonably accommodate him as mandated by the two acts.
The Department discharged Walker for repeated absences
from his work as a "printed-materials packer" for the Defense
The DPS, prior to Walker's termination,
Printing Service (DPS).
gave Walker permission to be hospitalized under a government
alcohol counseling and assistance program. Thereafter, Walker's
problems at work increased. However, these subsequent problems
were unrelated to his alcoholism. In discharging Walker, the
Department trej 9 his pre-treatment and post-treatment absences
cumulatively. The court ruled that by considering both pre-treatment
and post-treatment behavior tog hr, the Department failed to
The court stated that "an
reasonably accommodate Walker.
agency does not 'reasonably accommodate' an alcoholic employee
by keeping score of alcohol-induced, pre-treatment transgressions
for purposes of cumulation with non-alcoholic related misconduct
to produce an aggregatedisciplinary record warranting more
The court concluded that reasonable
severe punishment." accommodation of an alcoholic employee "requires forgiveness of
his past alcohol-induced misconduct in proportion to his _ingness to undergo and favorable response to treatment".
There are limits, however, to an employer's duty to
reasonably accommodate. The previous accommodation cases should
be conej Bted against Richardson v. United States Postal Service. There, the United States Postal Service discharged
an alcoholic employee who had been charged with assault with
intent to kill. He had attempted to kill his wife and himself.
The plaintiff alleged that, "if he had been accommodated for his
alcohol problem, his offense might not have happened, and thus

116/ Id. at 759-60, 761-62.
117/ Id. at 762.
118/ Id.
119/ Id.
120/ 613 F. Supp. 1213 (D.D.C. 1985).

his difficulties arose from the Posta1
attention to his alcohol handicap." -

9

ervice's inadequate

The court held that Richardson's claim that the Postal
ServicelI Wled to reasonably accommodate him was without
merit. The court found that Richardson was not discharged
because of poor performance due to alcohol abuse or for being an
alcoholic, but for his criminal conduct instead. The court
noted that the Rehabilitation Act, "does not create a duty to
accommodate an alcoholic who . . . commits an act which standing
alone disqualifies him from serviT 3 nd is not entirely a
manifestation of alcohol abuse".
Although these cases deal with the duty of reasonable
accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, the concepts of
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship under state laws are
generally consistent with those under the Rehabilitation Act.
Accordingl 4 ases decilunder the Rehabil
ion Act, like
Whitlock, --

Walker, -

and Richardson,

-W'

provide guidance

even for employers not covered under the Rehabilitation Act.
III.

Substance Abuse Testing and Collective
Bargaining Agreements

Unionized employees present additional problems for
employers seeking to impose substance abuse testing programs.
Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a unionized
employer has a duty to bargain with the employees' representative
over "wj,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment." Although the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

121/ Id. at 1215.
122/ Id. at 1215-16.
123/ Id. at 1216.
124/ See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
125/ See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
126/ See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
127/ National Labor Relations Act ch. 37, Section 1.49 Stat.
(Footnote Continued

has not ruled on the issue, a substance abuse testing program is
likely to be considered a mandatory subjectof collective
bargaining within the above definition. -A clear and
unequivocal waiver (in contract language and/or past practice)
may permit an employer to move forward without consultation with
the union. However, it is generally advisable for the employer
not to unilaterally implement a substance abuse testing program
without bargaining. Such an action may violate the NLRA.
Co., 129/
In Lockheed Shipbuildina and Construction
for example, the NLRB rul1 0 hat an employer violated the Labor
Management Relations Act when it unilaterally implemented a
pulmonary function and audiometric medical screening program.
Employees who failed the test were denied employment. The Board
held that the employer's action violated the NLRA. The employees'
collective bargaining agreement in effect contained specific
restrictions on physical examinations. The employer had unequivocally sought the right to establish th1 3 reening tests for a
different purpose during registrations. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit vacated an injunction
against a unilaterally implemented drug testing program in
Brotherhood of Maintenance ofVay Employees, Lodae 16 v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. The court found that the
program represented only a minor change in working conditions
and analogized it to a standard medical examination aimed to
ensure fitness for duty.
Accordingly, employers of union labor should review
their existing collective bargaining agreements to ascertain
whether a substance abuse testing program is expressly or

(Footnote Continued)
449, 450 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. Section 158(d)
(1982)).
128/ Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1327, 1333 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978).
129/ 273 N.L.R.B. 171
(1986).

(1984), proceded by 282 N.L.R.B. 41

130/ 29 U.S.C. Section 141

(1982).

131/ 273 N.L.R.B. 171.
132/ 802 F.2d 1016

(8th Cir. 1986).

impliedly prohibited. If such a program is expressly or impliedly
prohibited, at a minimum, good-faith bargaining is required
before such a program may be implemented. Even in the absence
of such a prohibition, however, it may be advisable to notify
the union in advance of implementing the program for legal and
practical reasons.
IV.

Criteria for an Effective Substance Abuse Testing Program

Mindful of the legal implications under both federal
and state law previously discussed, this Article will now
summarize the criteria for a substance abuse testing program
that would likely survive judicial scrutiny.
A.
1.

Public Employer

Legitimate State Interest

In order to implement what is otherwise a search and
seizure and/or invasion of privacy under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, a government employer must have a legitimate interest
for establishing a substance abuse testing program. Generally,
such interest is found in the public employer's duty to provide
a safe working environment and ensure the public welfare. Those
public employers (e.g., transportation), whose "mission" is such
that a mistake poses significant dangers to the public welfare
have the strongest interest in seeing that its employees are "fit
for duty". Substance abuse testing is one means of addressing
that interest.
2.

Reasonable Suspicion

While some "across-the-board" oj3 5yen random testing
unless there is a
programs have been upheld by the courts,
particularly compelling state interest, such testing should be
generally administered only where there is reasonable suspicion,
supported by objective evidence, that a particular individual is
using drugs and/or alcohol.

133/ Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power
See supra notes 23-28
Dist., 654 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987).
and accompanying text.
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3.

Equal Treatment

Since the chief purposes of substance abuse testing
are "fitness for duty" and safety, tests should be conducted for
other medical conditions that could impair an employee's ability
to perform his job safely.
Substance abuse should not be
treated differently than other disabling conditions.
4.

Policy Statement

Testing should be conducted pursuant to a written,
published policy. Applicants and employees should be apprised
of the policy prior to such testing. This notice, which may be
accomplished during interviewing or orientation, will 1 5Vuce
expectations of privacy by individuals being tested.
The
policy should define:
(a) the standards of conduct to which employees are
expected to adhere;
(b) the methods of detection to be used and the
circumstances under which testing will be conducted; and
(c) the consequences of positive results or an individual's refusal to be tested.
Care should be taken to minimize the "intrusion" into
the individual's privacy and ensure the "reasonableness" of the
search and seizure.
While it can b 3 pgued that urinalysis is
less intrusive than blood testing, if the procedure involved
unreasonably infringes upon an individual's expectation of
privacy such that it "detracts from human dignity
self
respect," it will not pass constitutional muster. -

134/ See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515
(D.N.J. 1986).
See also supra notes 32-40 and accompanying
text.
135/ See Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151 (D.N.J. 1985),
aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986).
136/ National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649
F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.),
emerQency stay denied, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987).
See also text
accompanying notes 41-52.

The employer's policy should indicate that testing is
a condition of employment and specify the consequences of a
positive result. The policy should provide reasonable accommodation, such as flexible work hours, transfers, and employee
assistance programs, although not imposing undue hardship on the
employer.
Discipline also may be specified where accommodation
would impose undue hardship, or where the individual refuses the
accommodation offered and the substance abuse either prevents
performance of the essential functions of the position or poses
a direct threat to the property or safety of others.
Refusal to
test may result in the same degree of discipline, which can
range from supervision to termination, imposed for positive test
results.
5.

Consent

Knowing and voluntary consent to the testing by each
individual tested will substantially reduce constitutional
concerns.
Informed consent cannot be accomplished without full
prior disclosure of the purposes of the testing,l_,methodology
to be utilized, and the potential consequences.
It may be
argued that a voluntary consent is impossible where submission
to testing is made a condition of employment, since such consent
would be provided under duress. Nevertheless, this Article
still recommends use of consent forms in connection with such
testing.
6.

Chain of Custody

The program should contain safeguards to ensure no
break in the chain of custody of the test specimen. This
minimizes the opportunity for error in the test result (e.g.,
misidentification of the sample) and specimen tampering.
Safeguarding the chain of custody also reduces exposure to
fourteenth am
ent claims that an employer denied the employee
due process.
7.

Reputable Laboratory

Careful selection of the testing laboratory and
appropriate confirmation (usually Gas Chromatography Mass

137/ See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12
See also text accompanying notes 95-96.
138/ Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. at 389.

(1905).

Spectometry, GCMS) of a positive result will ensure reliability.
This procedure will also reduce exposure to denial of due
process claims.
8.

Confidentiality

Test results should be kept confidential. Only those
management officials with a "need to know" (usually those who
participate in decision making based on the results) and the 1 3 9 /
individual tested should be afforded access to the results. The SupremelCourt has recognized a right of privacy in
medical information.
In addition, in Shoemaker, the Third
Circuit acknowledged that medical disclosure resulting as a
by-prodw/of urinalysis created grave confidentiality concerns. The Shoemaker court, however, upheld urine testing
of jockeys as constitutionally permissible. The court based its
decision on the fact that such confidentiality concerns had been
carefully addressed in statutory regulations strictly limiting
the use and publication of test ry
ts so as to guarantee the
jockeys' utmost confidentiality. In contrast, the district
court in Capua v. City of Plainfield struck down urine testing
as unconstitutional because the City had not established any
procedural safeguards foj 4 S sting and, in particular, confidentiality of the results. B.

Private Employer

The criteria for a successful private employer program
generally parallel those for public employer programs. However,
the criteria are somewhat more liberal in several material
respects. Public employers generally may not test absent
reasonable suspicion. Private employers (in the absence of
state action), on the other hand, may conduct across-the-board
testing (even absent reasonable suspicion) without the constitutional implications discussed above. Private employers are not

139/ 45 C.F.R. Section 84.14(d)(1)

(1986).

140/ Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
141/ Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1144.
142/ Id. at 1144.
143/ 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D.N.J. 1986).

subject to t
amendments.

4

imitations imposed by the fourth and fourteenth

Thus 1 4 0sent other laws, contracts or judicially-created
restrictions, private employers may test all job applicants
and all employes on a regular basis. Therefore, of course, they
may test also individual employees based on reasonable suspicion.
However, private employers should be careful to avoid singling
out individuals of protected racial or ethnic groups for drug 146/
testing or exposure to disparate treatment claims will result. Further, while random testing by private employers may be spared
constitutional scrutiny, such testing is more likely to result
in the disproportionate testing of protected groups. Moreover,
it may be destructive of employee morale (and, hence, productivity)
in some companies.
Therefore, random testing should be carefully
considered before implementation.

Substance abuse is a societal problem of crisis
proportions. The workplace is no exception. Substance abuse
testing, within the legal criteria discussed in this Article, is
but one way an employer (and thereby, society) can address the
problem. Testing programs are not a cure; but they can be a
form of damage control.

144/ Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).

(1972);

145/ Other legal theories, such as negligence, wrongful
discharge and defamation of character have not been considered
in this Article but may impact on the implementation or administration of a substance abuse program.
146/ New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979) (disparate impact theory); Teamsters v. United States,
theory).
U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977) (disparate treatment
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